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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Under current U.S. tax law, U.S.-parented multinational corporations 
(MNCs) have a lot of tax planning flexibility.  This is due in part to transfer 
pricing regulations that maximize taxpayers’ planning options.  Intellectual 
property-rich companies have drawn recent Congressional attention in part 
because of aggressive transfer pricing,1 although planning opportunities are 
 *  Associate Professor, UC Hastings College of the Law.  Many thanks for helpful comments 
to Ilan Benshalom and to participants in the Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration 
symposium cosponsored by the Pepperdine Law Review and Tax Analysts, particularly to co-
panelists Reuven Avi-Yonah, Allison Christians, and Robert Goulder.  This article is part of 
Pepperdine Law Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration 
symposium, co-sponsored by Tax Analysts. 
 1.  See Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, Inquiry into Tech Giants’ Tax Strategies Nears 
End, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at B1 (reporting on investigation targeting Apple, Google and others 
by Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and Senator Carl Levin). 
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not limited to the Apples and Googles of the world.2  Transfer pricing 
problems would persist regardless of the outcome of reform proposals on the 
table, including the possibility of “territorial” exemption of non-U.S. 
business income and related dividends from non-U.S. subsidiaries3 and the 
Obama Administration’s suggestion of a low but non-zero tax rate on 
foreign earnings.4 
Taxpayers exploit information asymmetry and regulatory complexity 
advantages in their aggressive application of transfer pricing regulations.  
But the government has important tools that it can use to address these 
problems.  This Article contributes to this symposium collection of tax 
advice for the second Obama Administration by advocating the use of 
regulatory discretion to edit the transfer pricing regulations and reduce 
corporate taxpayers’ flexibility to allocate taxable income away from U.S. 
affiliates and income tax deductions toward U.S. affiliates.  Others have 
developed specific proposals for the incremental adoption of formulary 
apportionment methods to help reform transfer pricing.5  This Article seeks 
to explain and emphasize the important role that U.S. tax regulations have 
played in enabling transfer pricing planning, and to encourage tax 
administrators to exercise their considerable power to give the transfer 
pricing regs a badly needed edit. 
Part II of this Article describes the statutory and regulatory framework 
under Section 482, which provides for transfer pricing and related rules that 
allocate income and deductions among affiliates within a related MNC 
group.6  Section 482 is a broad statute accompanied by long and detailed 
 2.  See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, U.S. Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes With Global Odyssey, 
BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-13/american-
companies-dodge-60-billion-in-taxes-even-tea-party-would-condemn.html (reporting on 
international tax planning strategies of pharmaceutical company Forest Laboratories); David 
Kocieniewski, At G.E. on Tax Day, Billions of Reasons to Smile, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at A1 
(noting the value of Subpart F’s active financing exception to the tax efficiency of GE’s “vast 
leasing and lending business abroad”). 
 3.  See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42624, MOVING TO A TERRITORIAL 
INCOME TAX: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 1–3 (2012) (describing tax reform landscape including 
territoriality proposals); see, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption 
System for Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 771, 775 (2001) (citing 
continuing role for transfer pricing under territoriality). 
 4.  See WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR 
BUSINESS TAX REFORM 13–15 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf. 
 5.  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment: Myths and 
Prospects, 2 WORLD TAX J. 371 (2011); Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of 
Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 
28 VA. TAX REV. 619 (2009); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. 
Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 
9 FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009). 
 6.  See infra Part II. 
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regulations.7  Part II also illustrates the approaches taxpayers take in 
assigning income and deduction items, which depend on an exploitation of 
taxpayers’ information advantages relative to the government and on the 
details of the regulations.8 
Part III argues that amending the transfer pricing regulations could 
constrain taxpayers’ planning options, for example by incorporating rules 
that refer to non-tax, high-friction data points.9  The Article envisions edits 
to the transfer pricing rules that incrementally add formulaic elements to the 
rules without adopting a formulary global transfer pricing standard.  
Incremental formulaic rules depart from the headline arm’s length transfer 
pricing message of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) and bear some similarity to transfer pricing 
approaches in non-OECD countries such as Brazil, China and India.  
Nevertheless, such an incremental approach should not produce 
intolerable tensions with U.S. commitments to an arm’s length standard in 
treaties and as a member of the OECD.  OECD white papers have begun to 
adjust the conception of the arm’s length standard and hint at incremental 
formulaic elements.  U.S. treaty partners might also benefit from 
incrementally formulaic rules that limit taxpayers’ ability to contractually 
allocate income away from tax haven jurisdictions. 
II.  GENERAL STATUTE, SPECIFIC REGULATIONS 
A.  The Baseline: Low U.S. Tax on Non-U.S. Income 
Corporations incorporated in the U.S., for example in a U.S. state such 
as Delaware, are subject to U.S. federal income tax on worldwide income.10  
A typical U.S.-parented multinational corporation structure features a U.S. 
corporate parent that owns non-U.S. operating subsidiaries through 
intermediate low-tax corporations.11  Because the U.S. rules treat separately 
 7.  See infra Part II.C. 
 8.  See infra Part II.D. 
 9.  See infra Part III. 
 10.  See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4)–(5) (2006) (defining domestic corporation and foreign corporation); 
I.R.C. §§ 881–882 (2006) (restricting taxation of foreign corporations to certain U.S.-source income 
and income effectively connected with a U.S. business). 
 11.  See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than Exemption, 59 
EMORY L.J. 79, 84–85 (2009) (summarizing argument that the imperfections of various U.S. 
international tax rules produce a system that is even more favorable to U.S.-parented MNCs than 
territoriality); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 707–14 (2011) 
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incorporated affiliates as separate taxpayers, non-U.S. corporate subsidiaries 
of a U.S. parent are not automatically required to pay U.S. federal income 
tax on all of their income.12   
Under applicable anti-deferral rules, a U.S.-parented MNC currently 
must pay tax on the income of its foreign subsidiaries to the extent such 
income falls into the definition of “subpart F income.”13  It must also pay 
U.S. income tax on dividends repatriated from non-U.S. subsidiaries.14  U.S. 
tax due on both subpart F inclusions and repatriated dividends is subject to 
reduction under applicable foreign tax credit provisions.15 
U.S.-parented MNCs face an incentive to engage in planning to reduce 
U.S. corporate income tax, including by (1) minimizing subpart F income,16  
(2) minimizing taxable repatriations, (3) maximizing the tax savings of 
foreign tax credit planning,17 (4) using treaty-shopping, “sandwich” 
planning, check-the-box elections and other strategies to leverage the U.S. 
network of bilateral income tax treaties and arbitrage differences between 
U.S. and non-U.S. law,18 and (5) exploiting U.S. transfer pricing and 
deduction allocation and apportionment rules.19  It is estimated that U.S. tax 
is imposed currently on non-U.S. business income earned by non-U.S. 
(arguing that the U.S. international corporate income tax system is an “ersatz territorial” system). 
 12.  See, e.g., Moline Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 438–40 (1943) (finding that a parent 
corporation and its subsidiary are generally separate taxable entities, with some exceptions, such as 
if the subsidiary is a sham or acts as a mere agent of the parent). 
 13.  See I.R.C. § 951(a) (2006).  Subpart F is intended to describe most categories of mobile and 
passive income.  See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, TAXES, Mar. 2004, 
at 29, 30 (referring to subpart F’s targeting of passive and base company income). 
 14.  See Shay, supra note 13, at 31. 
 15.  See I.R.C. § 901 (2006) (granting foreign tax credit); I.R.C. § 902 (2006) (providing for 
deemed paid foreign tax credit when foreign corporations distribute dividends to certain U.S. 
corporate shareholders); I.R.C. § 904 (2006) (providing foreign tax credit limitation rules).  Foreign 
tax credits can also reduce otherwise applicable U.S. income tax on other non-U.S. source income, 
such as interest and royalties.  Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World 
Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-border Income, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: 
ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 319, 324 (John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate Taxes]. 
 16.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened to Subpart F? U.S. CFC Legislation After 
the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX. REV. 185 (2005). 
 17.  See Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate Taxes, supra note 15, at 347 (emphasizing the 
importance of a firm’s foreign tax credit position); Kleinbard, supra note 11, at 725–26 (describing 
the foreign tax credit “distillery”). 
 18.  See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 11, at 707–13; see Jesse Drucker, Google’s 2.4% Rate 
Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, Bloomberg (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-
lost-to-tax-loopholes.html. 
 19.  See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax Policy, 62 
NAT’L TAX J. 703, 703–04, 711, 717 (2009) (estimating “financial” income-shifting and “real” 
productive asset location-shifting responses to higher U.S. tax rates and concluding that the financial 
effects—producing lost tax revenue of about $87 billion in 2002—were more than double the real 
effects). 
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subsidiaries in MNC groups at a rate of between 3% and 6%.20  The ability 
of firms to erode the U.S. tax base through such planning leads to the 
conclusion that the current U.S. system raises less tax revenue than would a 
territorial or exemption system that refrained from taxing non-U.S. business 
income, but included careful allocation rules that diminished U.S.-parented 
MNCs’ ability to reduce U.S. taxable income.21 
This Article focuses on planning under the transfer pricing regulations.  
U.S. tax administrators can use their regulatory discretion to combat 
taxpayers’ planning efforts under these rules and restrict the “freedom of 
contract”22 options available to taxpayers to allocate income to low-taxed 
non-U.S. affiliates, and conversely to allocate deductions away from low-
taxed non-U.S. affiliates and to U.S. operations.  These transfer pricing 
challenges will continue either in the current system or in the event of 
reform.  In fact, if the U.S. adopted a territorial or dividend exemption 
system, transfer pricing rules might be even more important, since after a 
U.S-parented MNC initially allocated business income to a low-tax 
jurisdiction, it would not face the possibility of residual U.S. tax on 
repatriated dividends.23 
Proposals like the one presented in this Article—which would tighten 
U.S. tax rules applicable to U.S.-parented MNCs—raise the concern that the 
tighter rules might cause a more serious economic problem than the public 
finance challenge caused by reduced corporate income tax revenue.  In other 
words, MNCs might respond by moving their businesses—not just their 
 20.  See HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME: 
DIVIDEND EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM 31–32 (2001) (reporting a 3.3% estimate for 
the overall burden of a dividend repatriation tax assuming an excess limitation foreign tax credit 
position and a non-U.S. effective tax rate below 10 percent); Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, 
Where Will They Go if We Go Territorial?  Dividend Exemption and the Location Decisions of U.S. 
Multinational Corporations, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 787, 797 (2001) (calculating a rate of 5.4% based on 
certain assumptions drawn in part from 1992 Treasury tax return data; the rate also reflects the 
assumption that intangible assets produce royalty income that bears the full U.S. top statutory rate 
for excess limitation firms). 
 21.  See, e.g., Harry Grubert, Enacting Dividend Exemption and Tax Revenue, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 
811, 814 (2001) (providing a static revenue gain estimate of $9 billion based on 1996 Treasury data 
and evaluating possible behavioral responses to territoriality adoption including “adjustments to 
overhead expenses and royalty payments”); see also J. Clifton Fleming, Robert J. Peroni & Stephen 
E. Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury is Empty, 13 
FLA. TAX REV. 397, 404 (2012) (stating that the current U.S. system sometimes permits a “negative 
rate of tax to be achieved on foreign-source income”). 
 22.  Richard J. Vann, Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the 
End of the World, 2 WORLD TAX J. 291 (2010) [hereinafter Vann, Hard-Boiled]. 
 23.  See, e.g., Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 3, at 776 (noting transfer pricing’s possible role in 
distinguishing between passive and mobile non-U.S. income). 
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taxable income24—elsewhere.25  For example, perhaps U.S.-headquartered 
MNCs might start incorporating parents outside the U.S.26 
This Article sets this concern about business location decisions aside.  
Non-tax considerations are very important to such location choices and so it 
is difficult or impossible to predict the impact of tax rule changes on 
business location.  In addition, the solutions recommended here are 
incremental steps that could be adjusted after initial implementation in 
response to evidence about the reaction of MNCs and the reaction of other 
countries that might attract MNC business.27 
 24.  Clausing, supra note 19, at 704 (reporting that MNC tax planning results in significantly 
more lost U.S. tax revenue than “real responses”); Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing 
Share of U.S. Multinational Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 
NAT’L TAX J. 247, 278 (2012) (reporting that lower foreign effective tax rates produce the result that 
MNCs allocate more profit to non-U.S. affiliates, but do not produce the result that sales shift from 
the U.S. to non-U.S. markets). 
 25.  Roger H. Gordon, Discussion, in response to Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate Taxes, supra 
note 15; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Do Strong Fences Make Strong Neighbors?, 63 
NAT’L TAX J. 723, 729 n.11 (2010). 
 26.  See Daniel Shaviro, The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 
377, 406 (2011).  This would change the current norm.  See Eric J. Allen & Susan C. Morse, Tax 
Haven Incorporation for U.S.-Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 395, 412, 
416–17 (2013) (noting norm of U.S. incorporation for U.S.-headquartered firms as well as 
exceptions such as insurance and marine transportation firms).  U.S.-headquartered firms generally 
incorporate parents in the U.S. even though it is difficult for them later to change this decision due to 
rules requiring the recognition of gain upon inversion transactions, see I.R.C. § 367 (2006); U.S. 
TREASURY OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS (2002), as well as more onerous U.S. anti-inversion rules enacted in 2004, see 
Jefferson P. VanderWolk, Inversions Under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code: Flawed 
Legislation, Flawed Guidance, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 699 (2010).  Some exceptions exist.  For 
example, several firms inverted prior to 2004, see Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., 
Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 
NAT’L TAX J. 409, 410, 416–20 (2002) (providing examples of firms inverted prior to 2004), and 
several firms inverted subsequent to 2004, but only after they moved to jurisdictions where they 
could argue that “substantial business activities” existed as required by Section 7872, see Stuart 
Webber, Inverted U.S. Firms Relocate Headquarters to Europe, 64 TAX NOTES INT’L 589 (Nov. 21, 
2011); Bret Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, 136 TAX NOTES 
429, 430–32 (July 23, 2012).  The “substantial business activities” requirement is now more difficult 
to satisfy as a result of the 2012 amendment to the regulations.  See Kevin M. Cunningham, The New 
Section 7874 Substantial Business Activity Exception Regulations: Closing the Door, 67 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 961, 965 (Sept. 3, 2012).  However, merger and acquisition activity is a remaining out for a 
U.S. corporation to accomplish an inversion transaction.  Eric Solomon, Corporate Inversions: A 
Symptom of Larger Tax System Problems, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 1203, 1208–09 (Sept. 24, 2012) 
(stating that expatriation can continue via merger and acquisition transactions after the revised 
Section 7874 regulations). 
 27.  See Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593, 
639–40 (2010) (criticizing global formulary apportionment proposals and suggesting incremental 
reform as an alternative); see also David L. Cameron & Philip F. Postelwaite, Incremental 
International Tax Reform: A Review of Selected Proposals, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 565, 567–68 
(commenting on importance of understanding incremental reform because of political economy 
constraints). 
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B.  No Truth in Transfer Pricing 
The OECD,28 the U.S.,29 the European Union (EU),30 and the United 
Nations31 —among others—reference the arm’s length standard as an 
appropriate benchmark for the assignment of income and deduction items to 
different affiliates of a multinational.  However, as others have observed, a 
literal understanding of the arm’s length standard is theoretically bankrupt.32  
Available benchmarks from third-party transactions do not provide a 
sufficient basis for allocating items among corporate affiliates.33  The core 
problem is this: If business firms exist in order to integrate management and 
production functions, realize cost savings, and produce better results, then at 
least some of the profit subject to allocation in the related party situation 
simply does not exist in any unrelated “comparable.”34 
 28.  See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS, at I-6 (2001) [hereinafter TRANSFER 
PRICING GUIDELINES] (“[T]he view of OECD Member countries continues to be that the arm’s 
length principle should govern the evaluation of transfer prices among associated enterprises.”). 
 29.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2012) (“In determining the true taxable income of a 
controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s 
length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.”). 
 30.  See Wolfgang Schön, Transfer Pricing, the Arm’s Length Standard and European Union 
Law, in ALLOCATING TAXING POWERS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 77 (Isabelle Richelle, 
Wolfgang Schön & Edoardo Traversa eds. 2013) (citing Case C-311/08, Société de Gestion 
Industrielle SA v. Belgium, 2010 E.C.R. I-00487, decided by the European Court of Justice, which  
referenced the arm’s length standard as an appropriate tool to combat “abusive arrangements”). 
 31.  See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION 
CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at 15–16, U.N. Sales No. 
E.12.XVI.1 (2012) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL TAX CONVENTION]. 
 32.  See, e.g., Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations and 
the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 641–45 (2007) 
[hereinafter Benshalom, Unsourceable] (noting the “theoretical deficiency” and “enforcement 
deficiency” of the arm’s length standard).  See also Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 5, at 
500; Vann, Hard-Boiled, supra note 22. 
 33.  See generally REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 
(2007) (“[I]t became clear by the late 1980s that the traditional methods for addressing transfer 
pricing problems were not sufficient because in the vast majority of cases they were not being 
applied in a satisfactory way.”). 
 34.  See Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for 
Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79, 87–94 (2008) (noting the incompatibility of arm’s 
length pricing with the key cost-internalization advantage of a vertically integrated firm); Richard J. 
Vann, Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm’s Length Principle, in THE TAXATION OF 
BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES 133, 140–41 (Brian J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville & Eric 
M. Zolt, eds. 2003) (explaining the difficulty of assigning taxable income based on the theory of the 
firm). 
13MORSE SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:09 AM 
 
1422 
A search for a fundamental theory of transfer pricing also draws little 
help from ideas about the proper source of income.35  Commentators have 
observed that determining income or deduction source, or the “economic 
allegiance” of an item of income or deduction,36 is theoretically intractable, 
or at least so hopelessly factually entwined as to be impossible to untangle.  
“Income . . . attaches to someone or something that consumes and that owns 
assets” or produces value through labor; “[i]ncome does not come from 
some place.”37  It is a fallacy to presume that a tax rule could unravel the 
complex web of factors supporting productive economic activity and even 
approximately determine a “correct” economic source for items of income 
and deduction, at least in most relevant cases presented by global business 
fact patterns.38 
It cannot be theoretically correct, for example, to say that interest 
income paid by a multinational corporate borrower owes primary “economic 
allegiance” to the place of incorporation of the MNC’s parent corporation.39  
The MNC’s global business supports the interest payment.  That global 
business in turn presumably owes “economic allegiance” not only to every 
place in which the MNC produces goods or services and every place in 
which the MNC’s customers reside, but also to every place in which its 
employees were educated, its property defended by relevant laws, the raw 
materials needed to support its venture supplied or protected, and so forth. 
C.  Section 482: Statute and Regs 
Despite the lack of a satisfying fundamental basis for the assignment of 
items of income and deduction among affiliates or among source countries, 
the U.S. rules (like other countries’ rules) must of course attempt the task.  
Section 482 is the main U.S. statutory provision governing the assignment of 
items of income to different affiliates of an MNC under transfer pricing 
principles.  It is very broad, and accordingly rather short relative to its role in 
dividing jurisdiction to tax.  The core of Section 482 provides as follows: 
 35.  See generally Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001). 
 36.  See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International 
Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1077–78 (1997) (describing the 1923 League of Nations “economic 
allegiance” principle). 
 37.  Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. 
System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 31 (Assaf Razin & 
Joel Slemrod eds., 1990). 
 38.  See Kleinbard, supra note 11, at 750–52 (describing “the fruitless search for source”). 
 39.  See I.R.C. § 861(a) (2006). 
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[T]he Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, 
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among [two or more 
organizations owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same 
interests], if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or 
allocation is necessary in order . . . clearly to reflect the income of 
any of such organizations . . . .40 
Another portion of Section 482 provides that “the income with respect to 
such transfer or license [of certain intangible property] shall be 
commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.”41 
This broad statute supports considerable regulatory discretion.  
Discretion is granted to tax administrators by the very terms of the statute.42  
But the regulatory discretion supported by this generously worded statute 
has, to date, largely been wasted.  The regulations under Section 482 are 
long and complicated.  They give too much away, in large part because they 
permit taxpayers to whipsaw the government at every turn by (1) choosing 
the most advantageous income and deduction assignment and sourcing 
methods for each particular set of taxpayer facts and (2) massaging the facts, 
for example through valuation analysis, to further improve the results. 
For example, the “dash four” and “dash seven” regulations promulgated 
under Section 482 apply to intangible property, including intellectual 
property (IP) such as patents, knowhow, trade secrets and the like.43  These 
regulations provide no fewer than six possible methods to use to determine 
 40.  See I.R.C. § 482 (2006). 
 41.  Id.  Section 861(b), relating to the sourcing of deductions, is similarly broad; it provides that 
U.S.-source income shall be reduced by “the expenses, losses, and other deductions properly 
apportioned or allocated thereto and a ratable part of any expenses, losses, or other deductions which 
cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of gross income.”  I.R.C. § 861(b).  An analysis 
of this provision lies outside the scope of this Article, though some of the observations relating to the 
enforcement disadvantages of taxpayer optionality have also been made in the deduction allocation 
context.  See Daniel Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of Alternative 
Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54 TAX L. REV. 353, 354–56 
(2001) (acknowledging a preference among commentators for “allocation to tracing”—in part 
because allocation is “less easily manipulated through tax planning”—but arguing that other factors 
are also important to the interest allocation rule, such as the approach taken by trading partners); see 
also Michael J. Graetz, A Multilateral Solution for the Income Tax Treatment of Interest Expenses, 
62 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 486 (2008). 
 42.  See supra text accompanying note 41; see also I.R.C. § 7805 (2006) (granting authority to 
“prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Code]”). 
 43.  Goodwill and going concern value are not included in the cross-referenced statutory section 
that limits the “commensurate with income” statutory provision contained in the statute’s second 
sentence.  See I.R.C. §§ 482, 936(h) (2006).  They are also not listed in the definition of 
“intangible,” contained in the dash four regs.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) (2011). 
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the payment made between affiliates for IP.  For example, in a U.S. parent–
non-U.S. subsidiary structure, the U.S. parent may license IP rights to the 
non-U.S. subsidiary in exchange for royalties priced under the comparable 
uncontrolled transaction, comparable profits, profits split, or another 
“unspecified” method under the dash four regs.44  A non-U.S. subsidiary 
may purchase a “buy in” interest in existing IP from the U.S. parent and pay 
a sum determined by an IP valuation that considers factors including relative 
U.S. and non-U.S. sales.45  Finally, the MNC may use a cost-sharing 
agreement for IP to be developed in the future, which requires the non-U.S. 
subsidiary to pay a share of the development costs proportional to the 
percentage of future benefits expected to be generated from the non-U.S. 
subsidiary’s share of the IP, for example as a result of non-U.S. revenue.46 
D.  Planning Under the Section 482 Regulations 
The U.S. government’s losses in two recent transfer pricing cases 
illustrate the ability of taxpayers to exploit what Richard Vann has called 
“[a] major structural flaw in current rules[,]” which is “the freedom of 
contract that is permitted to associated corporations.”47  In Xilinx, the 
taxpayer, a U.S. parent corporation, entered into a cost sharing agreement to 
create joint intellectual property ownership with a non-U.S. subsidiary.48  In 
Veritas, the government asserted that a U.S. parent corporation had 
undervalued intellectual property transferred to a foreign subsidiary; the 
government alleged that the taxable gain on transfer should correspondingly 
increase.49 
Under the Xilinx agreement, all deductions relating to the exercise of 
employee stock options were allocated to the U.S. parent.50  These 
deductions can be extremely large, as anecdotal cases of such deductions 
minimizing or eliminating high-technology firms’ taxable income 
demonstrate.51  When the government finally brought suit, it ultimately lost 
on rehearing before the Ninth Circuit.  The taxpayer’s argument—that an 
arm’s length agreement between third parties would not have shared stock 
 44.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(a)(1) (2011). 
 45.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(a)(2) (2012) (outlining rules for platform contribution 
transactions).  These transactions are also known as “buy-ins.”  Brauner, supra note 34. 
 46.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (2012) (providing rules for “cost sharing arrangements”). 
 47.  See Vann, Hard-Boiled, supra note 22, at 339. 
 48.  Xilinx Inc. v. Comm’r, 567 F.3d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on reh’g, 598 F.3d 1191 
(9th Cir. 2010), acq. in result AOD 2010-03. 
 49.  See Veritas Software Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 297, 312 (2009), nonacq. AOD 2010-49. 
 50.  Xilinx, 567 F.3d at 485. 
 51.  Rebecca Buckman, Cisco, Microsoft Get Income-Tax Break On Gains From Employee Stock 
Options, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2000, at B8.  
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option costs52—carried the day.  However, the arm’s length question was 
entirely counterfactual, since third parties would not have shared ownership 
of the underlying intellectual property, which was the software at the heart 
of Xilinx’s business. 
For purposes of this Article, the most interesting thing about the Xilinx 
case is the fact that the government got trapped in its own regulation and in 
its own relatively vague adoption of a headline “arm’s length” standard at 
the top of those regulations, without appropriate constraints throughout the 
rules as to what it meant by “arm’s length.”53  Nevertheless, the government 
successfully executed an end run around the arm’s length standard for future 
stock option expense.  It did this simply by redefining what it meant by 
“arm’s length,” and providing that employee option costs had to be shared in 
cost sharing agreements going forward, in order to comply with the 
regulations that defined the arm’s length standard.54 
The Veritas case presented the issue of the valuation of technology 
transferred from a U.S. parent to a foreign subsidiary in a “buy-in” 
transaction.55  The government could not rebut the taxpayer’s argument that 
the value of the technology—extremely high in hindsight—derived from 
more recent improvements made after the buy-in rather than from the 
originally developed IP initially transferred from parent to sub.56  Like the 
Ninth Circuit in Xilinx, the Tax Court in Veritas concluded that the 
government was backed into a corner by its own regulations.  The regs 
required valuation at the moment of transfer—rather than, for example, 
taking a cue from the statute and requiring the payment of variable royalties 
“commensurate with the income” of the intangible.57  Valuation is a fact-
 52.  Xilinx, 598 F.3d at 1197 (Fisher, J., concurring). 
 53.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Xilinx Revisited, 59 TAX NOTES 1621, 1621 (March 29, 2010). 
 54.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(a)(4), (d)(1)(iii), (d)(3) (2012).  Altera Corporation has challenged 
the ability of Treasury regulations to redefine “arm’s length” in the revised stock option cost sharing 
regs.  See Petition of Altera Corporation at 27-28, Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, Nos. 6253-12, 9963-12 
(Tax Ct. Mar. 6, 2012) (arguing that unrelated parties would not share stock options costs because of 
such costs’ volatility, the lack of relationship between such costs and research and development, and 
the incentives that such sharing would present for stock price manipulation).  In Altera, the 
government has the advantages of the broad discretion granted in the statute, see supra Part II.C 
(describing Section 482), together with the applicability of Chevron deference as confirmed in 
Mayo.  See infra Part III.B (discussing Mayo and Chevron). 
 55.  See Veritas Software Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 297, 299 (2009). 
 56.  See id. at 323–24. 
 57.  See, e.g., Veritas, 133 T.C. at 323–24 (“No buy-in payment is required for subsequently 
developed intangibles.”). 
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intensive question, and all of the facts are at the ready command of the 
taxpayer rather than the government.58 
The government has also tried to address the problem of buy-in pricing 
exemplified by Veritas through regulation.  However, it made the mistake of 
operating within the pre-existing model of permitting IP transfer through a 
“buy-in.”  It developed the concept of a “platform contribution transaction” 
(PCT), in an attempt to require taxpayers to more highly value U.S.-
developed IP and other value transferred from a U.S. parent to a non-U.S. 
subsidary.  Under the PCT regulations,59 the fact-specific game is tilted a bit 
more toward the government, but significant freedom of contract valuation 
flexibility remains in the hands of the taxpayer to determine the value of 
intellectual property at a moment of transfer.  A regulatory change that tied 
taxpayer results to an independent metric would do more to reduce 
taxpayers’ planning opportunities.60 
III.  CHANGE THE REGS TO GIVE TAXPAYERS LESS FREEDOM 
A.  The Current Regs Only Look Like Rules 
A brief consideration of the contrast between rules and standards helps 
to explain this Article’s recommendation to make the transfer pricing 
regulations operate more like rules and less like standards.  Rules are said to 
substantially constrain decision-maker choices61 and to permit those subject 
to the rules to “know what the rules are without adverting to basic 
principles.”62  A related view is that rules provide the substance of a law 
before affected stakeholders act, while standards provide content after those 
affected act.63 
Under these definitions, the transfer pricing rules look more like 
standards and less like rules, despite their length and use of specific 
 58.  See, e.g., Brauner, supra note 34, at 110 (noting problem of “information asymmetry”).  
Despite the disadvantages the government faces in fact-intensive buy-in valuation challenges, it has 
continued to pursue them.  See, e.g., Julie Martin, Amazon Fighting IRS Over Cost-Sharing 
Agreements, 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 223 (Jan. 21, 2013) (reporting IRS deficiency calculation of over 
$200 million based on valuation of transferred intangibles under a discounted cash flow method). 
 59.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(b)(1)(2), (c), (g) (2012) (providing PCT valuation methods 
including the income, acquisition price, market capitalization, and residual profit split methods). 
 60.  For example, Benshalom proposes determining the ownership of IP based on the location of 
employees that work in research and development.  See Benshalom, Unsourceable, supra note 32, at 
682. 
 61.  See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 520–38 (1988) (analyzing closed-
system nature of legal rules). 
 62.  Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 969 (1995). 
 63.  See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 568–
69, 621 (1992) (contrasting ex ante costs of promulgating rules with ex post costs of applying 
standards). 
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definitions and precise methodology.  Taxpayers’ known ability to plan 
around the transfer pricing regs, the government’s inability to curtail such 
planning, and taxpayer-favorable outcomes in recent transfer pricing cases 
all support the conclusion that the regulations do not substantially constrain 
taxpayer choices with respect to transfer pricing.  Nor can it be said 
that taxpayers or the government “know what the rules are without adverting 
to basic principles,”64 as neither can determine the content of the rule 
without reference to the basic, although fictional, principle of arm’s length 
pricing.  Finally, the regulations fail to specify transfer pricing results and 
leave that question to ex post determinations to be made based upon after-
the-fact experience with the rules as promulgated. 
Yet, because the transfer pricing regulations are specific and complex, 
they exhibit some of the disadvantages of rules as well.  Although greater 
complexity is sometimes expected to increase certainty by matching efficient 
and/or fair consequences to increasingly specific facts, rules cannot 
anticipate every transaction.  And because of tax planning, transactions that 
might be uncommon before tax rules come into force can become common 
after the fact.65  This occurs as taxpayers exploit less- and more-favorably 
taxed similar or “close substitute” transactions by moving toward the less-
taxed category,66 if doing so does not implicate significant nontax 
“frictions.”67  In transfer pricing, for example, the enormous effort put into 
articulating different ways to allocate and compensate the use of intellectual 
property permits taxpayer to choose among buy-in, cost-sharing, licensing, 
and other intercompany agreement models to, among other goals, optimize 
tax results. 
The underlying problem is that the transfer pricing regulations are 
drafted as if they are grounded in the standard of arm’s length pricing, but 
this standard is a sad fiction rather than a fundamental guidepost.  The arm’s 
length standard and the concept of income source have proven wholly 
inadequate to the task of providing a basic principle to underpin a transfer 
 64.  Sunstein, supra note 62, at 969. 
 65.  See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 869 (1999) 
(“Uncommon transactions that are taxed inappropriately become common as taxpayers discover how 
to take advantage of them.”). 
 66.  See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Line Drawing]. 
 67.  E.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1312, 1323–25 (2001) (noting that frictions such as business decisions, technology limitations, and 
high transaction costs limit tax planning). 
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pricing standard,68 and decided cases evidence the U.S. government’s 
inability to effectively use the arm’s length standard as a tool to counteract 
aggressive transfer pricing.69  The project of writing transfer pricing 
regulations as standards lacks promise in the absence of any fundamental 
guideline for the allocation of affiliated group income. 
For similar reasons, anti-abuse rules do not present a particularly 
promising path.  Such rules often draw on the idea that the statute pursues a 
coherent purpose.70  But here it cannot be said that a theoretically correct 
assignment of income or deductions among affiliated taxpayers exists.71  An 
anti-abuse rule accordingly would likely lack the principled underpinning 
that would permit it to provide a general solution to transfer pricing 
problems, although such a rule could be used as an enforcement device in 
extreme cases.72 
The best option is to promulgate specific changes to the transfer pricing 
regulations that move away from standard status and toward rule status.  A 
transfer pricing regulatory project in the second Obama Administration 
should move toward real rules, rather than complicated worse-than-rule 
standards that fail to provide ex ante content and permit taxpayers to 
arbitrage close-substitute differences generated by the specificity of the 
rules.  It should consider incremental formula-based transfer pricing reform 
that constrains taxpayers’ planning options, for example by anchoring results 
on nontax, high-friction reference points. 
B.  Why Regulation? 
U.S. tax administrators have a range of options in their guidance 
toolbox.73  They may pursue statutory changes; promulgate notice-and-
 68.  See supra Part II.B (explaining the inadequacy of arm’s length and economic allegiance 
concepts for the task of dividing jurisdiction to tax). 
 69.  See supra Part II.D. 
 70.  See Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 
492, 517 (1995) (considering what evidence can supply the content of a statute’s purpose); Mark P. 
Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 131, 137 (2001) (noting several 
commentators’ agreement that tax lawyers have the ability of “distinguishing the good from the 
bad”); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed 
Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 720-31 (proposing a more concrete framework for a 
purposive test). 
 71.  See supra Part II.B (arguing that neither the arm’s length standard not source-of-income 
concepts provide a principled basis for dividing jurisdiction to tax). 
 72.  For example, in SGI, the arm’s length principle was used to impute interest on an interest-
free related party loan.  Case C-311/08, Société de Gestion Industrielle SA v. Belgium, 2010 E.C.R. 
I-00487. 
 73.  See generally GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH (8th ed. 2010) (cataloguing 
varieties of guidance); Roberta Mann, Chief Counsel’s Subtle Impact on Revenue: Regulations, 
Litigation, and Administrative Guidance, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 889, 895–96 (2012).  Mann reports 103 
13MORSE SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:09 AM 
[Vol. 40: 1415, 2013]  The Transfer Pricing Regs Need a Good Edit 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1429 
comment regulations, which receive maximum deference under the Chevron 
standard;74 write Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures, which are 
commonly understood to articulate the government’s litigation position and 
are subject to less deference;75 and provide notice that the government will 
undertake future actions such as forthcoming guidance.76  In addition, the 
government can attempt to enforce its view retroactively as well as 
prospectively through litigation.77 
Regulation is the right tool for the job of improving the U.S. rules that 
assign items of income and deduction among MNC affiliates.  This is 
because the existing problems in this area arise from the optionality and 
complexity contained within the transfer pricing regulations themselves.  
The root cause of the problem will not go away until the regs are changed, as 
Xilinx and Veritas illustrate. 
Revised regulations promulgated under a notice-and-comment standard 
would receive strong deference. In 2011, the Supreme Court made clear in 
Mayo78 that the generally applicable Chevron79 standard of deference applies 
to tax regulations just as it does to other federal regulations.  Section 482 
delegates authority and is “ambiguous” with respect to “the specific issue” 
of how, exactly, income and deductions are to be assigned among commonly 
controlled affiliates, and so any “permissible construction of the statute” 
would stand under Chevron,80 even if it represented a change from 
previously promulgated guidance.81 
revenue rulings, 169 revenue procedures, and 292 notices over a three year period.  See Mann, 
supra, at 896. 
 74.  See Mayo Found. For Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711–15 
(2011).  See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
45 (1984); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013). 
 75.  See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 260 (citing Skidmore standard as consensus appropriate 
standard of review and questioning consensus view); Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting 
Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 666–68 (2012) (discussing 
Skidmore deference as the appropriate standard).  The Skidmore standard evaluates guidance based 
on “factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”  See Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 76.  See Mann, supra note 73, at 896 (nothing the publication of 292 Notices over three years). 
 77.  See Mann, supra note 73, at 894 (identifying the joint role of IRS Chief Counsel and 
Department of Justice attorneys in deciding what cases to litigate). 
 78.  See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711–15 (2011). 
 79.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. 
 80.  Id. at 842–43. 
 81.  Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (providing the standard sometimes 
invoked pre-Mayo in the review of tax regulations and considering among other factors “consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements”).  Mayo clearly applies to final regulations promulgated after 
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The relatively slower pace of notice-and-comment regulatory change 
relative to other administrative action—such as Notice practice—is part of 
the price of fixing an existing regulatory problem.82  Yet regulatory change 
has certainty and process advantages over other, non-administrative courses 
of action.  Regulation faces fewer public choice challenges than 
Congressional lawmaking.83  Regulation carries less outcome uncertainty 
than litigation.  And because the regulatory process is unilateral, it can be 
carried out more quickly than bilateral treaty negotiations. 
Finally, the capacity of the regulatory process to engage in systematic 
analysis may permit it to do a better job than would other courses of action 
in limiting what David Schizer has termed “planning options”84 and Richard 
Vann calls “freedom of contract” under existing regulations.85  In general, a 
tax planning option is more valuable if it offers more possible outcomes, 
“because the well-advised taxpayer is more likely to find an especially 
favorable one (while avoiding unfavorable ones).”86  Regulation has an 
advantage relative to Revenue Ruling and Revenue Procedure guidance and 
litigation because it has the capacity to more comprehensively address the 
subject at hand.  In contrast, more limited methods of guidance that target 
particular transactions rather than broader prospective solutions have the 
notice-and-comment.  See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 75, at 661–63 (2012) (noting remaining 
uncertainty if these elements are not met). 
 82.  The promulgation of tax regulations should follow the relatively involved “notice and 
comment” regulatory process prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act.  See Kristin E. 
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with 
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1732–40 
(2007) (outlining Administrative Procedure Act and I.R.C. § 7805 requirements as applied to 
Treasury regulations).  Regulations take more time to implement, generally apply only 
prospectively, and are more difficult to change.  Several preview devices exist for minimizing the 
disadvantages of a delayed and complex regulatory process resulting from these limitations.  
Notices, for example, can be used to pre-announce intended regulatory changes without 
overspecifying them.  The government can also use proposed regulations (which technically 
announce the government’s position and are not binding) and temporary regulations, with their 
official shelf life of three years.  RICHMOND, supra note 73. 
 83.  See MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, CORPORATE TAX REFORM (2011); Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. 
Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 336–38 (1995) (arguing that 
managers have incentives to favor policies that encourage additional investment or otherwise make 
possible increases to individual returns such as salaries); Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, 
and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 536–42 (2009) (citing “unevenness resulting 
from the different use of corporate tax preferences, interest deductions, and tax shelters”). 
 84.  Schizer coined the term “planning option” to describe taxpayers’ capacity to tax plan by 
restructuring transactions and considered the concept in the context of tax shelters and derivative 
transactions.  See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax 
Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1344–45 (2000) (distinguishing the “planning option” from the 
“timing option” offered by decisions such as when to sell an appreciated investment position (citing 
George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51 ECONOMETRICA 611, 
621–23 (1983)). 
 85.  See Vann, Hard-Boiled, supra note 22. 
 86.  Schizer, supra note 84, at 1351. 
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potential to increase regulatory complexity and thus increase taxpayers’ 
planning options. 
Although regulation practice is within tax administrators’ discretion, it 
is not immune from Congressional influence and lobbying.  Two 1998 
examples illustrate successful efforts to “lobby the regs.”  In Notices 98-5 
and 98-11, the IRS and Treasury stated that they would write regulations 
foreclosing certain international arbitrage opportunities in, respectively, the 
foreign tax credit and subpart F areas.87  The entity classification “check-the-
box” rules promulgated in 1996 had recently made these arbitrage 
opportunities widely available.88  A firestorm of protest erupted in reaction 
to Notice 98-5 and Notice 98-11, including the objection that the Notices 
inappropriately protected other nations’ tax revenue.  Treasury withdrew the 
notices, and in the case of its withdrawal of the subpart F notice, provided 
generous transition relief based on the date regulations were finalized, which 
has not yet occurred.89 
But this story need not read as the defeat of clumsy tax administrators at 
the hands of suave lobbyists.  With respect to the issue of foreign tax credit 
abuse facilitated by check-the-box regulations, the government subsequently 
made significant progress by uncovering the problem of “foreign tax credit 
generator” transactions;90 enacting temporary anti-foreign-tax-credit 
generator regulations under Section 901 in 2006;91 proposing an anti-
foreign-tax-credit splitter statute, Section 909, which was enacted in 2010;92 
and developing a sophisticated litigation strategy that is working well, with 
three government wins so far.93  Vocal advocacy groups that object to MNC 
tax planning have also emerged over the last five years.94 The presence of 
 87.  See I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-3 I.R.B. 49 (addressing foreign tax credits); I.R.S. Notice 98-
11, 1998-6 I.R.B. 18 (addressing arrangements under subpart F). 
 88.  See, e.g., Lokken, supra note 16, at 196–97. 
 89.  I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-27 I.R.B. 35 (withdrawing Notice 98-11); I.R.S. Notice 2004-19, 
2004-11 I.R.B. 606 (withdrawing Notice 98-5). 
 90.  See Robert Goulder, Government Learned of Foreign Tax Credit Abuse Through 
International Information Exchanges, 2007 TNT 93-5, Doc 2007-11594 (reporting that information 
exchange with the UK tax authorities helped the IRS and Treasury discover foreign tax credit 
generator transactions). 
 91.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(f) (2011); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 42 Fed. Reg. 44240 
(Aug. 4, 2006). 
 92.  See I.R.C. § 909 (2006); Education Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act (signed into law 
August 10, 2010). 
 93.  See Pritired 1, LLC v. Comm’r, 816 F. Supp. 2d 693 (D. Iowa 2011); Bank of New York 
Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. No. 2 (Feb. 11, 2013); Hewlett-Packard v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 
2012-135. 
 94.  See, e.g., Tax Justice Network, http://www.taxjustice.net (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (“We 
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such groups at notice-and-comment proceedings might meaningfully change 
an environment otherwise dominated by MNC lobbyists. 
C.  Fewer Planning Options, Nontax Frictions 
The current section 482 regulations give taxpayers numerous planning 
options and generally do not tether transfer pricing results to any high-
friction non-tax reference point.  Their complexity is not warranted by their 
capacity to deter taxpayer planning or by their ability to seek the truth about 
the correct assignment of items of income and deduction.95  And the 
government has broad discretion to change them.  It should do so. 
Revised transfer pricing and deduction sourcing rules should reduce 
taxpayer flexibility by giving taxpayers fewer planning options and 
incrementally incorporating formulary rules that use high-friction nontax 
reference points.96  An example of a proposed rule that follows this model is 
Ilan Benshalom’s proposal to assign IP ownership, as well as its related 
deductions and income, to the jurisdiction where the employees who 
produce the IP are based.97  Benshalom has also proposed a method for 
allocating income among affiliates of financial institutions based on tangible 
property and payroll.98 
Other changes are also possible.  As one example, existing cost-sharing 
regulations do not cover all U.S.-based overhead expenses, and other 
transfer pricing rules permit generous allocation of deductions to U.S. 
parents.99  Requiring the assignment of deductions to non-U.S. subsidiaries 
based on a high-friction metric such as profit or revenue might improve the 
result from the standpoint of the U.S. government, and could be 
accomplished through a regulatory change.100 
support a level playing field on tax and we oppose loopholes and distortions in tax and regulation, 
and the abuses that flow from them.”). 
 95.  See supra Part II.B (explaining the inadequacy of arm’s length and economic allegiance 
concepts for the task of dividing jurisdiction to tax). 
 96.  See Schizer, supra note 84, at 1357–62; Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 67, at 1665-68 
(considering the importance of behavioral distortions to the efficiency of tax rules). 
 97.  See Benshalom, Unsourceable, supra note 32, at 682. 
 98.  See Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to 
an Allocation Phase, 28 VA. TAX REV. 165 (2008). 
 99.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(5) ex. 4 (2012) (requiring the sharing of time of “an executive 
officer who oversees a research facility” based on “the controlled participants[’] reasonabl[e] 
allocat[ion]”).  The transfer-pricing regulations applicable to related party services are also relevant 
to the allocation of overhead costs.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9 (2012). 
 100.  Deduction allocation is a well-known challenge in the event of adoption of a territorial 
system as well as under the existing system.  See, e.g., Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 3, at 780-82 
(discussing expense allocation issues). 
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D.  What About the OECD? 
A unilateral U.S. move to more formulaic transfer pricing rules would 
interact with transfer pricing norms mediated by international organizations 
and in particular by the OECD and the UN.  Both the OECD, which 
generally represents developed nations’ interests in this area, and the UN, 
which often represents developing nations’ view, devote significant 
resources to transfer pricing.  Although both organizations publicly support 
policy strategies that use the platform of the arm’s length standard, members 
of the UN have explicitly embraced specific formulaic approaches, including 
for the assignment of residual profit.   Thus similar U.S. changes would 
arguably make the U.S. a transfer pricing pioneer within the OECD and 
would move U.S. transfer pricing policy closer to the policies of non-OECD 
countries such as Brazil, China, and India, even though the changes would 
also resemble formulaic approaches to other problems, such as interest 
expense apportionment, within the U.S. rules. 
 As argued below, despite the divergence of incremental unilateral 
formulary approaches with the official OECD arm’s length party line, the 
U.S. adoption of such approaches presents an attractive risk/return profile.  
Incremental rule changes do not present the significant risks that would be 
presented by unilateral adoption of a global formulary apportionment 
standard.  Rather, incremental rule changes would comport with increasing 
acceptance of the importance of incremental formulary methods to allocate 
residual profit as evidenced by between-the-lines suggestions in OECD work 
that such methods can play a useful role within the arm’s length standard, by 
some countries’ use of such methods, and by academics’ acceptance of their 
importance. 
The proposals described here are less ambitious than global formulary 
apportionment proposals,101 although they share with such proposals the 
strategy of limiting taxpayer options by reference to high-friction nontax 
data points such as certain property, or payroll, or sales.102  Incremental 
transfer pricing reform is more feasible and less risky than sweeping 
adoption of a global formulary apportionment approach.  Worldwide reform 
requires unrealistic assumptions about global cooperation and perhaps 
unacceptable inflexibility following the adoption of any global standard.103   
Unilateral reform or worldwide reform with inconsistent tax rates and/or tax 
 101.  Cf. Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 5 (advocating for a system of global formulary 
apportionment). 
 102.  See id. at 509–10. 
 103.  See Morse, supra note 27, at 639–40. 
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bases also raises significant tax planning and economic factor manipulation 
risks due to firms’ incentive to minimize the identified factors in high-tax 
jurisdictions.104  Especially in an allocation formula that relies on very few 
factors, the factors would have high salience and material bottom-line 
impact on a firm’s tax bill.105  Finally, unilateral reform faces significant 
practical obstacles because of the difficulty of achieving congressional 
action and the possibility that a complete replacement of the arm’s length 
standard would violate U.S. treaty obligations.106 
Incremental unilateral U.S. regulations that restricted taxpayers’ 
“freedom of contract” in transfer pricing,107 as proposed here, would differ 
from worldwide formulary apportionment.  Such incremental reform would 
not formally depart from the arm’s length standard, but instead would 
redefine it.  Incremental reform would not require global cooperation, would 
retain future flexibility with respect to U.S. policy options, and would raise 
less concern about factor manipulation.   
However, the reaction of treaty and trading partners remains a valid 
consideration in the event of incremental changes to the U.S. transfer pricing 
rules for at least two reasons.  First, the general goal of maintaining good 
foreign relations may discourage transfer pricing approaches that diverge 
from those adopted by treaty partners.  Second, the “last in time” rule that 
provides that treaties and statutes have equal force of law, so that a later-
enacted treaty trumps an earlier-enacted statute,108 does not apply to later-
enacted regulations.  Instead, regulations may be challenged not only by 
sovereign treaty partners, but also by affected taxpayers, who may claim that 
a later-enacted regulation is not consistent with the earlier understanding of 
the treaty partners when they entered into the treaty.109 
 104.  See, e.g., Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promises and Pitfalls of Adopting 
Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169 (2008) (describing incentives for 
changed corporate structures including increased use of commissionaires). 
 105.  See Morse, supra note 27, at 617 (citing JOANN MARTENS-WEINER, COMPANY TAX 
REFORM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 33–34 (2006)). 
  106.   See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4150, OPTIONS FOR TAXING MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 23 (2013) (observing that the European Union limited its optional formulary 
consolidated tax base proposal in part as a result of concerns about treaty partner objections). 
 107.  Others also suggest incremental moves in this area.  E.g., Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra 
note 5. 
 108.  See I.R.C. § 7852(d) (2006). 
 109.  See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (acknowledging 
doctrine of deference to treaty interpretation adopted by both treaty partners (citing Sumitomo Shoji 
Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982))); Xerox, 41 F.3d at 655–57 (refusing to decide 
foreign tax credit availability for a certain U.K. tax based on unilateral Treasury technical 
explanation of treaty and other unilateral guidance where evidence indicated that neither the Senate 
nor the U.K. government endorsed Treasury view); see also Michael S. Kirsch, The Limits of 
Administrative Guidance in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1084, 1098 
(noting that, consistent with the Vienna Convention, “courts have looked to a wide range of 
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If treaty partner views continue to evolve and increasingly accept the 
incremental use of formulary methodology, such a taxpayer claim that an 
incremental formulary rule is not consistent with treaties will likely only 
work retrospectively.  Consider the hard-fought NatWest case.  This case 
culminated in the Federal Circuit’s 2008 holding that U.S. regulations that 
apportioned interest expense among affiliates according to a formula 
violated the U.S.–U.K. treaty because they “disregard[ed] interbranch 
transactions” and violated the parties’ understanding, at the time of the 
treaty’s execution, about allocating interest as if affiliates were “separate 
enterprises.”110 
The NatWest decision presumably helped the taxpayer in the case, 
which challenged U.S. interest allocations for the tax years 1981 to 1987.  
Perhaps it also helped taxpayers with contemporaneous challenges to the 
interest expense apportionment regulations.  But the U.S. government stuck 
to its formulary approach for interest expense going forward.  One 
commentator has suggested that “knowing that any subsequent treaties 
would incorporate the evolving views of the OECD, the Treasury probably 
kept the Regulation intact because it is acceptable under the more recent 
OECD commentary.”111  Similarly, today evidence from OECD projects and 
perhaps also EU court decisions112 suggests that views on the correct 
interpretation of the arm’s length standard are evolving toward a greater 
acceptance of incremental formulary methodology. 
The OECD, which has historically strongly endorsed the arm’s length 
standard,113 nevertheless has begun to acknowledge its limitations.  For 
supplementary materials to illuminate the shared understanding of the United States and its treaty 
partners” and that “a joint technical explanation is likely to be given significant weight by U.S. 
courts”).  Kirsch also argues that Article 3(2) as generally incorporated into most treaties “explicitly 
contemplate[s] that unilateral legal developments” may change the application of a treaty after it is 
signed, by providing that an undefined term “has the meaning that it has at [the] time [of application 
of the treaty] under the law of that State.”  Id. at 1093. 
 110.  Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 512 F.3d 1347, 1355–59 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
The court relied heavily on 1963 OECD model treaty commentary and did not consider 1984 OECD 
commentary, which postdated the 1975 agreement, to be relevant, id. at 1359.  The U.K. government 
filed an amicus brief in support of the taxpayer, which provided further evidence of the lack of a 
1975 agreement on the propriety of the interest apportionment formula adopted by the U.S., see id. at 
1351 (noting U.K. amicus brief filed in trial court). 
 111.  Brian Caster, After NatWest: How Courts Should Handle OECD Commentary in Double 
Taxation Treaty Interpretations, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1317, 1345 (2011). 
 112.  See Schön, supra note 30, at 88–91 (discussing ECJ development of the idea of a “balanced 
allocation of taxing powers”). 
 113.  See, e.g., TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at I-6 (“[T]he view of OECD 
Member countries continues to be that the arm’s length principle should govern the evaluation of 
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example, OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) materials 
acknowledge that “the international common principles drawn from national 
experiences” appear inadequate to the task of dividing tax jurisdiction in the 
modern globalized economy, and identifies the pressure on transfer pricing 
issues.114  More specifically, the OECD has developed a discussion draft 
relating to the transfer pricing treatment of intangibles.  In this draft, it 
explains that “relevant functions, risks and costs” might not be “in alignment 
with contractual allocations” of returns from intangibles, in which case 
transfer pricing adjustments might address the disconnect.115  It also 
acknowledges the limitations of the arm’s length standard for transfers of 
intangibles, since related parties might undertake transactions in intangibles 
that unrelated parties “would not contemplate.”116 
Examples in the discussion draft reveal the OECD’s struggle to identify 
methods that make use of comparables recognizable within the arm’s length 
framework but still provide room for adjustments that increase the value of 
intangibles that produce more profit than expected or allocate residual profit 
to affiliates that bear more risk, as indicated by high-friction business 
decisions rather than intercompany contract.117  The methods are not 
explicitly formulaic, but they seem to move in that direction.  For example, 
the possibility of increasing royalties paid for the use of an intangible is 
framed by the assumption “that there is evidence that independent 
enterprises would have insisted on protection in the form of . . . price 
adjustment[s].”118  The discussion draft is silent on the point of whether it 
anticipates rules that make that assumption, which would make the transfer 
pricing adjustment more formulaic; or rules that require an adjusting 
government to establish the basis for such an assumption, which would 
largely permit taxpayers to maintain their current freedom of contract with 
respect to setting such royalty rates. 
In the EU, decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) affect the 
transfer pricing debate.  In the recent SGI case, the ECJ upheld Belgian 
transfer prices among associated enterprises.”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 53, at 1621 (discussing 
OECD pressure  to apply the arm’s length standard and its possible impact on the Xilinx decision). 
 114.  ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 47 
(2013) [hereinafter OECD BEPS PAPER]. 
 115.  ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., DISCUSSION DRAFT: REVISION OF THE SPECIAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTANGIBLES IN CHAPTER VI OF THE OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES 
AND RELATED PROVISIONS 17 (2012) [hereinafter OECD DISCUSSION DRAFT].  See also OECD 
BEPS PAPER, supra note 114, at 47 (summarizing transfer pricing points by noting that the existing 
OECD transfer pricing guidelines are “perceived by some as putting too much emphasis on legal 
structures (as reflected, for example, in contractual risk allocations) rather than on the underlying 
reality of the economically integrated group”). 
 116.  OECD DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 115, at 21. 
 117.  See id. at 40–59 (giving examples 1-22). 
 118.  See id. at 58 (giving example 21). 
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transfer pricing adjustments that, for example, imputed interest payments on 
an interest-free loan from a Belgian parent to its French subsidiary.119  The 
court relied on the idea of correcting an “artificial” arrangement in 
explaining its reasoning that the Belgian law was justified.120 
Although the Belgian government won in SGI, the case could be read 
either to protect prices advocated and better documented by the taxpayer or 
to support government transfer pricing adjustments.  Tax advisors who 
suggest that Belgian corporate affiliates can guard against any similar 
challenge by improving their transfer pricing documentation predictably 
contend that taxpayers can use the decision as a shield.121  But there is 
another way to look at the ECJ decision that reconciles it with developments 
in the OECD and elsewhere.  Wolfgang Schön argues that on the facts of the 
case the ECJ  endorsed the idea of arm’s length pricing as a tool that 
governments can use to address the problem of “artificial” pricing 
arrangements.122 
Aside from developments at the OECD and in the EU, individual 
member countries contributing to UN transfer pricing policy go further and 
explicitly apply formulaic methods to allocate profit, including residual 
profit.  The UN includes the concept of arm’s length pricing in its model 
treaty123 and has reconfirmed support for the standard in a 2012 white 
paper.124  Yet the report acknowledges that several important countries 
interpret the standard to permit formulary methods of allocation, if they 
accept the standard at all.  Brazil, for example, uses predetermined profit 
margins for imports and exports.125  China emphasizes that location-specific 
advantages provided by China should result in more allocation of profit to 
 119.  Case C-311/08, Société de Gestion Industrielle SA v. Belgium, 2010 E.C.R. I-00487. 
 120.  Id.; see also Philip Baker, Transfer Pricing and Community Law: The SGI Case, 38 
INTERTAX 194–96 (2010). 
 121.  See, e.g., Corporate/International Tax Alert: ECJ Allows Profit Adjustment in Non-Arm’s 
Lenght [sic] Transactions, DELOITTE (Jan. 2, 2010), http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_BE/be/76a 
759f1e9d86210VgnVCM200000bb42f00aRCRD.htm. 
 122.  Schön, supra note 30, at 91–93. 
 123.  U.N. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 31, at 15–16. 
 124.  See Comm. of Experts on Int’l Coop. in Tax Matters, U.N. Practical Manual on Transfer 
Pricing for Developing Countries (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/ 
documents/bgrd_tp.htm.  See also Julie Martin, Practitioners Weigh Impact of U.N. Transfer Pricing 
Manual, 68 TAX NOTES INT’L 457 (Oct. 29, 2012) (reporting that Brazil, India and China did not 
succeed in an effort to persuade the UN to refute the arm’s length standard). 
 125.  See Comm. of Experts on Int’l Coop. in Tax Matters, supra note 124, § 10.1 (describing 
Brazil’s predetermined profit margin approach). 
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China.126  India contends that profit should follow risk, and rejects 
multinationals’ claim that their affiliates engaged in, for example, contract 
research and development are engaged in low-risk activities.127 
In addition to the growing consideration of incremental use of formulary 
methods in multinational white papers and government audit positions, 
important non-U.S. academics also stand in the corner of increased use of 
formulary methods.  Schön, for example, contends that the ECJ’s 
characterization of the arm’s length standard as a tool to address transfer 
pricing abuse should permit formulary elements.128  Vann argues that 
“[p]rofit allocation can work through transactions but only if freedom of 
contract and the permitted transactions are constrained, or certain types of 
transactions are simply presumed which effectively allocate the residuum to 
the places where the firm is operating.”129 
Finally, it is possible that a particular incremental formulary change to 
U.S. transfer pricing regulations might not produce objections from treaty 
partners because the regulations might have an advantageous result for such 
treaty partners.  For example, transfer pricing regulations that reference 
high-friction, non-tax data might assign profit to U.S. and treaty partners at 
the expense of low-tax holding company affiliates.130  U.S. tax 
administrators might explore the possibility of styling rules as safe harbors 
in part to reduce the chance of treaty-based challenges.131  And competent 
authority proceedings can help resolve conflicts that do arise.132 
 126.  See id. § 10.2.3 (describing China’s treatment of location specific advantages). 
 127.  See id. § 10.3.4 (describing India’s risk analysis). 
 128.  See, e.g., Schön, supra note 30, at 97 (“[W]e have to face the fact that traditional transfer 
pricing control under the arm’s length standard is on the downturn in the European Union.”). 
 129.  Vann, Hard-Boiled, supra note 22, at 339. 
 130.  Treaty partners, like the U.S., face concerns about MNC tax planning.  For example, several 
U.S.-parented MNCs, such as Google, Amazon, and Starbucks, have come under scrutiny in the 
U.K. because they are paying “little or no corporation tax” in that country despite large their 
operations.  Mark Thompson, U.K. Targets Google, Amazon, and Starbucks on Taxes, CNNMONEY 
(Dec. 3, 2012, 8:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/03/news/uk-tax-avoidance/index.html.  
While testifying before a British parliamentary committee, Starbucks cited the fact that since starting 
business in Britain in 1998, it had only one profitable year there, “though it also admitted that its 
British business had made payments for coffee to a profitable Starbucks subsidiary in Switzerland 
and large royalty payments to another profitable subsidiary in the Netherlands for use of the brand 
and intellectual property.”  Corporate Taxation: Wake up and Smell the Coffee, ECONOMIST, Dec. 
15, 2012, at 66. 
 131.  A safe harbor might put forth a pro-government formulary rule and permit taxpayers that 
follow the rule to receive greater assurances from the government about the certainty of the outcome.  
The government’s entry into an advance pricing agreement, for example, might be conditioned on 
taxpayer compliance with safe harbors.  Although an analysis of the potential role of transfer pricing 
safe harbors falls outside the scope of this Article, such an analysis could include consideration of 
the impact of safe harbor-styled regulations on treaty challenges and consideration of the likely take-
up of safe harbor offers by different taxpayers. 
 132.  Mutual agreement proceedings are generally required by treaty.  See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOP. & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 25 (2010); U.S. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The second Obama Administration should seize a regulatory 
opportunity in the area of transfer pricing.  It has broad discretion to change 
the transfer pricing regulations as they apply to corporate multinationals, and 
these regulations need changing, because they give far too much leeway to 
taxpayers and will continue to serve an important function in the division of 
international tax jurisdiction regardless of the fate of reform proposals.  
Xilinx and Veritas illustrate that taxpayers whose transfer pricing is 
challenged can successfully repel a government challenge by hiding behind 
arm’s length definitions in the government’s own regulations.133  Because 
the regs present the problem, changing the regs will provide the solution. 
U.S. tax administrators should write revised transfer pricing rules that 
afford taxpayers less contracting freedom.  They should incrementally add 
formulaic elements to rules and use high-friction, nontax reference points. 
Although the changes might appear to present a tension with longstanding 
treaty commitments to the arm’s length standard in transfer pricing, as 
articulated by OECD, a developing global consensus supports increased 
incremental use of formulary methods.  Treaty partners might well accept 
and perhaps follow such changes, particularly if they resulted in the 
allocation of income away from low-tax affiliates and toward treaty partner 
jurisdictions as well as the U.S. 
 
TREASURY DEP’T, MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 25 (2006).  Transfer pricing cases 
predominate, though procedure is unclear.  See Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 
1407, 1433–37 (2012) (noting “obscure” nature of MAP process). 
 133.  See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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